Zugleich gedruckt erschienen im Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin: ISBN 978-3-7983-2323-0 / Die Arbeit thematisiert die Verarbeitung von Komplex-Anaphern. Dieser Anaphern-Typ hat einen größeren Textabschnitt, der einen oder mehrere Sätze umfasst, als Antezedenten (Antezedensfeld) und bezeichnet abstrakte Entitäten (z.B. Sachverhalte oder Proposition...
International audience
Published in Argumentation
Argumentation is a cognitive category. Texts cannot be said to be argumentation, nor can argumentation be said to lie in texts. This is an almost trivial semiotic point of departure, but it is quite relevant nevertheless. In this contribution, three reasons are developed to emphasize and to articulate the semiotic component of argumentation to show...
Published in Philosophia
The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this proce...
Published in Information Fusion
Published in International Cooperation, Convergence, and Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations
Published in Synthese
A hyperintensional semantics for natural language is proposed which is agnostic about the question of whether propositions are sets of worlds or worlds are (maximal consistent) sets of propositions. Montague’s theory of intensional senses is replaced by a weaker theory, written in standard classical higher-order logic, of fine-grained senses which ...
International audience
Published in Biosemiotics
Against the view that symbol-based semiosis is a human cognitive uniqueness, we have argued that non-human primates such as African vervet monkeys possess symbolic competence, as formally defined by Charles S. Peirce. Here I develop this argument by showing that the equivocal role ascribed to symbols by “folk semiotics” stems from an incomplete app...
Published in Philosophia
It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitudes. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional ...
