Holler, Marit
Published in
Review of Network Economics
Buyers are often active on multiple digital platforms, while gatekeeper platforms can force sellers contractually to use one platform exclusively. This paper considers the welfare effects of such exclusivity clauses for buyers, sellers and platforms in a platform duopoly with a seller membership fee. A setting with partially multihoming buyers and ...
Tarasov, Alexander Zubrickas, Robertas
Published in
Economic Theory
This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208, 1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market...
Buccella, Domenico Fanti, Luciano Gori, Luca
Published in
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This article extends the cost-reducing R&D model with spillovers by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers.” The American Economic Review 78: 1133–7, 1990. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum.” The American Economic Review 80: 641–2) to allow quantity-setti...
Mutascu, Mihai Ioan Albulescu, Claudiu Tiberiu Apergis, Nicholas Magazzino, Cosimo
Published in
Environmental science and pollution research international
This study investigates the co-movements of gasoline and diesel prices in three European countries (i.e. Germany, France, and Italy) with different fuel tax systems in place. The methodology follows a time-frequency approach, allowing us to analyse the co-movements at different frequencies and moments in time. As a novelty, we study the impact of f...
Herrera-Velasquez, Jose de Jesus
This study explores the reciprocal effects between agency problems and market competition. We develop an adverse selection model of a competing conglomerate with production constraints. The conglomerate participates as the leader in two different duopolistic markets with a Stackelberg-Cournot framework and heterogeneous goods. The conglomerate is r...
Park, Chul-Hi Lee, Sang-Ho Nakamura, Tamotsu
Published in
Asian Journal of Law and Economics
This study investigates the impact of target emissions from polluting firms on the production of green technology and the optimal policy decisions of privatization on the eco-industry under their voluntary commitments. For this, we formulate a vertical structure consisting of a downstream polluting industry and an upstream mixed eco-industry where ...
Loertscher, Simon Marx, Leslie M.
Published in
Review of Economic Design
Traditional analysis takes the public or private nature of goods as given. However, technological advances, particularly related to digital goods such as non-fungible tokens, increasingly make rivalry a choice variable of the designer. This paper addresses the question of when a profit-maximizing seller prefers to provide an asset as a private good...
Mougeot, Michel Naegelen, Florence
Published in
Review of Network Economics
Certain health insurers offer a free choice of providers and an identical copayment regardless of the provider. Others build networks and use selective contracting and financial incentives to channel policyholders to contracted suppliers. In the case of unregulated prices, we compare these two policies when the off-network medical service is not co...
Achdou, Yves Bertucci, Charles Lasry, Jean-Michel Lions, Pierre-Louis Rostand, Antoine Scheinkman, José A.
Published in
Finance and Stochastics
We propose a plausible mechanism for the short-term dynamics of the oil market based on the interaction of a cartel, a fringe of competitive producers, and a crowd of capacity-constrained physical arbitrageurs that store the resource. The model leads to a system of two coupled nonlinear partial differential equations, with a new type of boundary co...
Basak, Debasmita Mukherjee, Arijit
Published in
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
We provide a new rationale for socially insufficient market entry. We show that if the shadow cost of public funds is sufficiently high, the number of firms under free entry can be socially insufficient if the tax policies are “time inconsistent”, so that the governments cannot commit to the tax policies before market entry of firms. Hence, strateg...