Published in Economic Theory
We study a model in which each of finitely many agent cares about a given subset of finitely many goods. We provide minimal conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector - a price vector for which supply meets demand.
Published in European Economic Review
Highlights•Paper considers two-part tariffs charged by platforms in a two-sided market.•It allows for heterogeneous trading behavior of agents.•This results in a unique equilibrium, which has many reasonable properties.•Unique equilibrium provides empirically testable predictions on prices.•Profit-dominant equilibrium selection is not robust to a s...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
•We study two properties of beliefs, type-sensitivity and optimism.•We provide an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.•We provide a lower bound on the movement of the rationalizable strategies (after parameter change).•The results extend the study of rationalizability beyond global games.•Our results imply new uni...
Published in Theory and Decision
In political economy, the seminal contribution of the Baron–Ferejohn bargaining model constitutes an important milestone for the study of legislative policy making. In this paper, we analyze a particular equilibrium characteristic of this model, equilibrium uniqueness. The Baron–Ferejohn model yields a class of payoff-unique stationary subgame perf...
We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function
