Wittgenstein and the Concepts of Mind in Hegel. Hegel distinguishes three main forms of the (subjective) mind – the soul, the consciousness and the spirit. He seeks to use these concepts to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle’s works on the soul (Περὶ ψυχῆς) and, at the same time, to counteract certain scientistic tendencies within the philosophy of mind. Although Wittgenstein (most likely) was not aware of these Hegelian distinctions, his own use of the concepts of mind exhibits some remarkable similarities to Hegel’s, and Wittgenstein too develops his understanding of mind by first examining the scientific psychology of his time and delineating his own position by way of contrast with it. This article examines three areas in which Wittgenstein substantially developed his understanding of the concepts of mind. The sequence of the investigation follows the order in which these areas became significant for Wittgenstein’s thinking, and compares them in each case with the three main Hegelian forms of the concepts of mind.