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Vote trading with and without party leaders

Authors
  • Casella, Alessandra
  • Palfrey, Thomas
  • Turban, Sébastien1, 2, 3, 4
  • 1 Columbia University
  • 2 NBER
  • 3 CEPR
  • 4 Caltech
Type
Published Article
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2014
Accepted Date
Jan 14, 2014
Volume
112
Pages
115–128
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.001
Source
Elsevier
Keywords
License
Unknown

Abstract

•Vote-trading may be coordinated by the group leaders, or take place in a market.•Trading through leaders, the minority wins too rarely.•With market trades, the minority wins too often.•Thus vote trading through leaders always improves over no-trade.•But vote-trading through the market can be welfare reducing.•The theoretical predictions are strongly supported by experimental data.

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