This study examines if theory of deception can be understood in successful air operations on a tactical level. Research on deception is mostly conducted on a strategic level and the different theories vary in aim and tend to be comprehensive. Studies of air power are mostly conducted on a tactical level and deception within air power has become more common throughout the years. This study aims, using a theory testing case study, to explain how theories of deception work on a tactical level. The analysis is based on Barton Whaley’s structure of deception, and the cases that were analyzed were the Six-Day War and Operation Desert Storm. The result showed that the theory partly could describe deception on a tactical level as a majority of the different categories of Whaleys theory were present in both conflicts. However, the priority of the different categories in the theory did not correspond to either of the cases. This led to the conclusion that Barton Whaley’s theory of structure of deception does not alone describe success in air operations on a tactical level.