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Syntheticity and Recent Metaphysical Readings of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Authors
  • Gurofsky, Simon R. MA1
  • 1 Carleton University, 3A35 Paterson Hall, ON K1S 5B6 , (Canada)
Type
Published Article
Journal
Kant-Studien
Publisher
De Gruyter
Publication Date
Mar 05, 2020
Volume
111
Issue
1
Pages
104–132
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1515/kant-2020-0003
Source
De Gruyter
Keywords
License
Yellow

Abstract

Metaphysical readings of Kant’s theoretical philosophy in the Critical period are ascendant. But their possibility assumes the possibility of existence- and real-possibility-judgments about things in themselves. I argue that Kant denies the latter possibility, so metaphysical readings have dubious prospects. First, I show that Kant takes existence- and real-possibility-judgments, as necessarily synthetic, to require a relation to sensible intuition. Second, I show that the most promising metaphysical readings can ultimately neither satisfy nor explain away that requirement for existence- and real-possibility-judgments about things in themselves. I conclude with pessimistic reflections on the prospects for the metaphysical interpretive project.

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