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Stackelberg game of buyback policy in supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-averse supplier based on CVaR.

Authors
Type
Published Article
Journal
PLoS ONE
1932-6203
Publisher
Public Library of Science
Publication Date
Volume
9
Issue
9
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0104576
PMID: 25247605
Source
Medline

Abstract

This paper considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single supplier sells a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. We assume that the supplier and the retailer are both risk averse and utilize Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), a risk measure method which is popularized in financial risk management, to estimate their risk attitude. We establish a buyback policy model based on Stackelberg game theory under considering supply chain members' risk preference and get the expressions of the supplier's optimal repurchase price and the retailer's optimal order quantity which are compared with those under risk neutral case. Finally, a numerical example is applied to simulate that model and prove related conclusions.

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