Affordable Access

deepdyve-link
Publisher Website

Is it Socially Efficient to Impose Job Search Requirements on Unemployed Benefit Claimants with Hyperbolic Preferences?

Authors
  • Cockx, Bart
  • Ghirelli, Corinna
  • Van der Linden, Bruno1, 2
  • 1 SHERPPA, Ghent University, Tweekerkenstraat 2, B-9000 Gent
  • 2 IRES, Université Catholique de Louvain, Place Montesquieu 3, B1348, Louvain-la-Neuve
Type
Published Article
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2014
Accepted Date
Mar 11, 2014
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.03.006
Source
Elsevier
Keywords
License
Unknown

Abstract

•Graphical analysis for hyperbolic discounting in job-search model with monitoring•Monitoring of job search effort is socially efficient under hyperbolic discounting•Social efficiency may not attain if non-complying behaviour is taken into account•Imperfect observation of search effort exacerbates the risk of social inefficiency•These theoretical results are compatible with the mixed empirical findings

Report this publication

Statistics

Seen <100 times