Affordable Access

deepdyve-link
Publisher Website

Nash Bargaining and Policy Impact in Emerging ISP-CP Relationships

Authors
  • GARMANI, Hamid
  • AIT OMAR, Driss
  • EL AMRANI, Mohamed
  • baslam, mohamed
  • JOURHMANE, Mostafa
Publication Date
Oct 30, 2020
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1504/IJAHUC.2020.110819
OAI: oai:HAL:hal-02562834v1
Source
HAL-Descartes
Keywords
Language
English
License
Unknown
External links

Abstract

This paper studies a non-neutral network where internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for content delivery. We investigate the mutual interaction among ISP and CP in two cases: 1) competitive case, where the ISP charge CP for delivering content to end-users; 2) cooperative case, where the two providers (CP, ISP) jointly optimise their strategies, to maximise their aggregate profits. We formulate the interactions between multiple ISPs (multiple CPs) as a non-cooperative game. We utilise bargaining games to analyse how the side payment between CP and ISP is determined. Also, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proven. Based on the best response dynamics method, we propose a distributed iterative algorithm, starting from any initial strategies vector and converge to that Nash equilibrium. Finally, through extensive simulations, it has been verified that cooperation is the best choice for three entities, i.e., ISP, CP, and end-users.

Report this publication

Statistics

Seen <100 times