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Kant’s Critical Objection to the Rationalists in the B-Deduction

Authors
  • Tai, Terence Hua1
  • 1 National Chung Cheng University, 621301 , (Taiwan)
Type
Published Article
Journal
Kant-Studien
Publisher
De Gruyter
Publication Date
Nov 21, 2020
Volume
111
Issue
4
Pages
531–559
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1515/kant-2020-0051
Source
De Gruyter
Keywords
License
Yellow

Abstract

According to a familiar reading of Kant, he denies the possibility alleged by the rationalists of our having non-sensible or intellectual intuition. I argue in this article that he simply holds the possibility to be groundless. To put the contrast in terms of a distinction Kant makes in the A-Paralogisms, he raises a “dogmatic” objection to the rationalists in the former case, and a “critical” one in the latter. By analyzing the two-step argument in the B-Deduction, I defend the “critical” reading, which may, I hope, shed light on how Kant can justify his claim – which may be regarded as a second-order, methodological one pivotal to his Critical project – that possible experience serves as the only guideline for proving that we can cognize objects a priori.

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