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A Value with Incomplete Communication

Authors
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
26
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0641
Keywords
  • Value
  • Graph
  • Associated Game
  • Consistency
  • Perron–Frobenius Theorem
  • Nonnegative Matrix
Disciplines
  • Communication

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this article is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom. The generalization proposed here is different from the Myerson value, and it coincides with the Shapley value in the case of full communication. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71.

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