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The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions

Authors
Journal
Mathematical Social Sciences
0165-4896
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
66
Issue
2
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.002

Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates the effect of resale allowance on entry strategies in a second price auction with two bidders whose entries are sequential and costly. We first characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies. We then show that there exists a unique threshold such that if the reseller’s bargaining power is greater (less) than the threshold, resale allowance causes the leading bidder (the following bidder) to have a higher (lower) incentive on entry; i.e., the cutoff of entry becomes lower (higher). We also discuss asymmetric bidders and the original seller’s expected revenue.

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