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Economics at the FTC: Non-price Merger Effects and Deceptive Automobile Ads

Authors
  • Jones, Matthew1
  • Kobayashi, Bruce1
  • O’Connor, Jason1
  • 1 Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC, 20580, USA , Washington (United States)
Type
Published Article
Journal
Review of Industrial Organization
Publisher
Springer US
Publication Date
Oct 19, 2018
Volume
53
Issue
4
Pages
593–614
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-9669-1
Source
Springer Nature
Keywords
License
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Abstract

Economists at the Federal Trade Commission analyze a wide range of activities, practices, and policies in support of the agency’s consumer protection and competition missions as demonstrated by the two economic analyses discussed in this article. The first section of this article describes the economic analysis of a proposed merger’s impact on non-price dimensions of competition in the daily fantasy sports market. The second section builds an economic model to quantify the harm to consumers from deceptive advertising in automobile markets.

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