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Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

Authors
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
85
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.015
Keywords
  • Preference Aggregation
  • Strategy-Proofness
  • Population Monotonicity

Abstract

Abstract An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet–Kemeny aggregation method.

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