Abstract In the new paradigm, institutions are long-term endogenous. Thus the aims of land reform must be compatible with, replace, or substitute for initial incentives and power structures. Many ″reforms″ e.g., compulsory collectives, are not. Redefinition of ″land reform″ is therefore needed. Yet, the case for private land redistribution (with ceilings) remains; the inverse relationship rests firmly on lower cost labor transactions in small farms — though large (but competitive) transport or processing firms, which enjoy lower cost capital transactions, may be needed. Crucial is the impact of the postreform structure on livelihoods, especially for the growing rural majority near-landless workers. New style, market-based reforms have potential — probably best combined with old-style ceilings; substantial compensation, with urban taxpayers sharing costs; alternative off-farm prospects; and progressive taxes on large landholdings or bequests.