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On strong representations of games by social choice functions

Authors
Journal
Journal of Mathematical Economics
0304-4068
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
15
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4

Abstract

Abstract Games in characteristic function form are used to model an allocation of decision power among individuals involved in a voting situation. The problem of strong representation is to find a strategically acceptable social choice function that entails the allocation of power prescribed by a given game. Within the class of non-weak characteristic function games, we fully characterize the games that admit a strong representation. We apply this result to Peleg's problem of strong representation of simple games. Our results indicate that a strong representation requires significantly more than has been recognized in the literature.

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