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Davidson on the Impossibility of Psychophysical Laws

Authors
  • Herstein, G. L.1
  • 1 Southern Illinois University, Department of Philosophy, Carbondale, IL, 62901, U.S.A , Carbondale
Type
Published Article
Journal
Synthese
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Publication Date
May 01, 2005
Volume
145
Issue
1
Pages
45–63
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-5866-6
Source
Springer Nature
Keywords
License
Yellow

Abstract

Donald Davidson’s classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidson’s argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility.

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