The search for a naturalistic theoretical model capable of providing answers to the phenomenon of consciousness has guided the perspectives in philosophy of mind in the last century. Especially with the recent advent of scientific knowledge in the information age, the search for an understanding of the relationship between mental states and their respective physical substrates that is reconcilable with the objectivist approach to research has become the norm. Henceforth, reductionist perspectives of consciousness have become a paradigmatic species offering views that postulate from the full identity between mental and brain events to the denial of conscious experience as perceived in the first person. Given this, the present dissertation proposes, at first, to appreciate some of the main theoretical axes that sustain the materialist strands, exposing more and less technical objections to each of them. In another moment, the work in question intends to argue in defense of the consciousness as irreducible property starting, with prominence, of the emergentist conceptions of Chalmers and Searle. Finally, it comes to the conclusion that despite the explanatory power of indirect theoretical-methodological interpretations, as far as consciousness is concerned, any suggestion that fails to encompass the subjectivity of qualitative experience seems bound to be incomplete.