Braucht die Logik Objekte? Die Ontologie logischer Gegenstände im Tractatus und Erfahrung und Urteil
- Authors
- Publication Date
- Apr 14, 2019
- Source
- Liège Université - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique
- Keywords
- Language
- French
- License
- Unknown
- External links
Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Edmund Husserl’s Experience and Judgement (Erfahrung und Urteil) are based on remarkably different conceptual frameworks and methodologies. After analyzing their respective accounts on the foundations of (formal) logic, I map out their common aims and different conclusions. I hold that Husserl and Wittgenstein both use the epistemic necessity of the existence of logical relations among things as an argument against philosophical skepticism, but their different epistemological convictions lead them to decisively diverging accounts of the nature of those relations. Wittgenstein assumes a syntactic correspondence theory of truth, which identifies general logical form as necessary condition for accurate representation, apparent in the existence of local truth-functions between propositions. As logical form is the (transcendental) necessary condition of every meaningful proposition, he infers that it is itself not representable and without ontological status. Husserl, by contrast, does not draw from a correspondence theory, but from a processual theory of certainty and truth, which offers genetic instead of categorical distinctions between perception and the logical relations apparent in conceptual knowledge. His theory of formal logic ultimately offers a coherent ontology for logical objects, which avoids logical mysticism.
