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Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

Authors
  • Mathevet, Laurent1, 2
  • 1 Department of Economics
  • 2 University of Texas at Austin
Type
Published Article
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2014
Volume
85
Pages
252–271
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.005
Source
Elsevier
Keywords
License
Unknown

Abstract

•We study two properties of beliefs, type-sensitivity and optimism.•We provide an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.•We provide a lower bound on the movement of the rationalizable strategies (after parameter change).•The results extend the study of rationalizability beyond global games.•Our results imply new uniqueness results.

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