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Bargaining power in repeated games

Authors
Journal
Mathematical Social Sciences
0165-4896
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
49
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.07.001
Keywords
  • Repeated Games
  • Renegotiation
  • Bargaining Power

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we propose a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, selection-consistent perfect equilibrium. This concept reflects the idea that players may not expect future bargaining power to be correlated with bygone actions. The equilibrium payoff set is generated by equilibria with a simple recursive structure. When discounting tends to zero, the equilibrium average payoff set is almost completely determined by the data of the stage game.

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