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Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences

Authors
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
44
Issue
2
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00049-6
Keywords
  • Lexicographic Preferences
  • Evolutionary Stability
  • Complexity
  • Lexicographic Nash Equilibrium
Disciplines
  • Linguistics

Abstract

Abstract We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278–305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from “lexicographic evolutionarily stability” (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken.

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