In this essay, I investigate Swedish possibilities to influence the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (CAP). After having summarized my findings, I try to explain the structure of influence by using Multi-level governance theory. Ten years have passed since Sweden joined the Union, and many changes have followed in the agricultural sector. By investigating the small country of Sweden's possibilities to influence CAP, I hope to be able to get a notion of the possibilities to influence the EU in general. The essay examines four possible paths for agricultural interests to influence the policy process in Brussels: * Through elected representatives of Sweden in the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and in the Swedish Parliament * Through subnational institutions, such as the local authorities and regional representatives. * Through the Swedish Agricultural Office * Through the Swedish pressure group within the agricultural area, LRF These four groups all have very different channels to the policy process on agricultural issues. The differences are mostly in terms of decisive power or advisory power and institutional contacts or lobby contacts. The multi-level governance approach recognises that the EU system is open for influence in all of these forms, and that it is thus a very complex system. MLG-theory also recognises the important part played out by pressure groups, which in such a system have relevant access to the policy process. I have found that one can not talk about one single Swedish will for the development of CAP, which is why the MLG-theory is a better tool for analysing the structure of influence than a state-centric approach. The importance of the agricultural pressure group is therefore stressed, since it offers Swedish citizens in the agricultural sector another channel of influence, if they find the government's preferences different from their own.