Affordable Access

Publisher Website

A note on optimal procurement contracts

Authors
Journal
Information Economics and Policy
0167-6245
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
2
Issue
3
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/0167-6245(86)90034-x
Keywords
  • Bilateral Monopoly
  • Asymmetric Information
  • Contracts
  • Information
  • Procurement

Abstract

Abstract In many transactional relationships, new information and varying circumstances make it desirable to change contract terms well after investments in specific assets have created a situation of bilateral monopoly. Decisions about specification changes are made on the basis of asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller about costs and valuations. The analysis herein indicates how ex post public information might be employed to achieve a fully efficient method for determining specification changes and their reimbursement.

There are no comments yet on this publication. Be the first to share your thoughts.