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Joint production in teams

Authors
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
0022-0531
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
130
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005
Keywords
  • Contract Theory
  • Incentives
  • Moral Hazard
  • Teams
  • Theory Of The Firm

Abstract

Abstract Consider Holmström's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a i -dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if ∑ i = 1 n a i / ( n - 1 ) < m . Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof equilibria.

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