Affordable Access

Publisher Website

Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games

Authors
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
22
Issue
2
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0598
Disciplines
  • Communication

Abstract

Abstract This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have some a prioriinformation content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.

There are no comments yet on this publication. Be the first to share your thoughts.