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Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies

Authors
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
0022-0531
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
75
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2274

Abstract

Abstract This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61(1993), 29–65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford ( Econometrica 63(1995), 103–144). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C79.

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