Affordable Access

Post Mortem Reputation, Compensatory Gifts and Equal Bequests

Uppsala University, Department of Economics Uppsala
Publication Date
  • D10
  • D31
  • D63
  • D64
  • Ddc:330
  • Altruism
  • Bequests
  • Inheritances
  • Gifts
  • Equal Division
  • Post Mortem Reputation
  • Social Norm
  • Information
  • Intergenerationale Übertragung
  • Erbe
  • Familienökonomik
  • Overlapping Generations
  • Altruismus
  • Theorie


The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and financial property) to compensate less well off children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, first, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More specifically, this reputation is deteriorating in the difference in amounts inherited. We show that, given optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.

There are no comments yet on this publication. Be the first to share your thoughts.