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A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

Authors
Journal
International Journal of Production Economics
0925-5273
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
136
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.09.019
Keywords
  • Supply Chain Coordination
  • Alternating Direction Method
  • Information Sharing
Disciplines
  • Design

Abstract

Abstract We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.

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