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The central assignment game and the assignment markets

Authors
Journal
Journal of Mathematical Economics
0304-4068
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
10
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90038-6

Abstract

Abstract Initially this paper considers an assignment game without side payments and proves the non- emptiness of the core of it. Next, a market model with invisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption is presented, and the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model are shown, using the first result. Finally this paper presents a generalization of the market model and also shows the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

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