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On the economics of international environmental agreements

Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
Publication Date
  • Q20
  • Ddc:330
  • Umweltabkommen
  • Verhandlungstheorie
  • Theorie
  • Ecology
  • Geography


This paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction efforts. The paper discusses also a reversible and- a irreversible technology option and demonstrates that compensating a third country for the introduction of an irreversible technology may be even advantageous for the donors when this technology incurs higher costs than a reversible one.

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