Affordable Access

Publisher Website

Consistent restricted Shapley values

Authors
Journal
Mathematical Social Sciences
0165-4896
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
33
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00821-9
Keywords
  • Transferable Utility Game
  • Power Structure
  • Effectiveness
  • Axiom System
  • Consistency
Disciplines
  • Mathematics

Abstract

Abstract Transferable utility games with an additional power structure on the coalitions are considered. This power structure is not given explicitly, but only implicitly via a value; a value is a map that assigns an N-vector to every game with player set N. The implicit power structure is described by the concept of effectiveness of a coalition for a given value. The effectiveness of coalitions is constrained by axioms; in particular, the collection of effective coalitions is assumed to be closed under taking unions. Other axioms concern efficiency and consistency in a sense related to the consistency axiom of Hart and Mas-Colell. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of a class of restricted Shapley values, with the effective coalitions forming a lattice.

There are no comments yet on this publication. Be the first to share your thoughts.