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Old Whitfield Residence showing Balcony on which Gen. La Fayette spoke while on his American Visit of 1824

Harrison's Pharmacy
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Microsoft Word - Dissertation The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant and Mill Margaret Marie Chiovoloni A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2011 Approved by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Susan Wolf Alan Nelson Douglas MacLean Bernard Boxill ii Abstract Margaret Marie Chiovoloni The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant and Mill (Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) Hume, Kant and Mill each approach morality with distinctly different frameworks and methodologies, but it is important to acknowledge that they all share the crucial thought that morality involves an impartial point of view. Hume and Kant both recognize that morality is universal: what is right for one must be right for all. They both use this recognition as the starting point for their investigations. Furthermore, we can interpret Mill’s proof so that it moves from a first-personal point of view to an impartial point of view. By addressing the most serious objections to the role of universality in each of these philosophical systems, I make room for acknowledging the shared ground from which each of these philosophers begin their investigations. Critics of Hume have worried that emphasizing the general point of view in his system will lead to conflicts with those passages in which he denies the role of reason in morality. I argue that these conflicts can be resolved by attending to a distinction between moral reactions and moral judgments. Critics of Kant object to his argument that the universal law formulation is a formulation of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that this general point of view does not accurately pick out worthy maxims. I argue that Kant does not expect the iii general point of view, as expressed in FUL, a

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