Affordable Access

Egalitarian solutions in the core



In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also define and axiomatize the egalitarian core, a set of core allocations for which no transfer from a rich player to a poor player is possible without violating the core restrictions. We find an inclusive relation of the leximin stable allocation and of the Lorenz stable set into the egalitarian core.

There are no comments yet on this publication. Be the first to share your thoughts.


Seen <100 times

More articles like this

An axiomatization of the egalitarian solutions

on Mathematical Social Sciences Jan 01, 1985

Egalitarian solutions forn-person bargaining games

on Mathematical Social Sciences Jan 01, 1998
More articles like this..