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The evolutionarily stable strategy under individual condition and tactic frequency

Authors
Journal
Journal of Theoretical Biology
0022-5193
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
176
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1995.0172

Abstract

Abstract A proof is presented to show that, when fitnesses from alternative tactics within a population depend on both their frequency and the phenotypic condition of individuals, there will be a unique ESS switchpoint s *that determines both the condition at which an individual will switch between tactics and the resulting frequency of the tactics in the population. For an individual at the ESS s *, the fitnesses of the alternative tactics will be equal. When fitness is averaged over the population, however, the average fitnesses of the alternative tactics will not be equal.

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