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Capacité d'engagement de l'Etat, redistribution et croissance

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The state's capacity to commit, redistribution, and growth A model of the struggle for power is analysed, showing the part played by the ability of the state to commit on the level of its expenditures for maintaining peace. In this case, the state has the monopoly over military expenditures, and we get either a redistributive equilibrium, or a "pretorian" equilibrium, with an over-militarised state, according to the model's parameters. Without credibility, the group excluded from power gets armed as well in some cases, and civil war occurs. These equilibria are imbedded in a model of the aK type, with a constant propensity to save, showing the impact of the state's credibility on growth.

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