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Voting by veto

Authors
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
0047-2727
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
10
Issue
1
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(78)90005-1

Abstract

Abstract This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.

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