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Political economy of a public corporation:Pricing objectives of BART

Authors
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
0047-2727
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
13
Issue
3
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90008-3
Disciplines
  • Political Science

Abstract

Abstract The revealed preference approach is used to identify the objectives implicit in the fare structure of a rail mass transit system. A model assuming bureaucratic aggrandizement provided a better predictor of actual fares than a majority rule or interest group political model. Bureaucratic objectives work to the advantage of commuters from distant suburbs who are relatively wealthy and young. The data is too weak to support firm conviction about these conclusions, but our methods contribute to quantitative political economy.

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