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Strategic Timing in Group Negotiations: The Implications of Forced Entry and Forced Exit for Negotiators with Unequal Power

Authors
Journal
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
0749-5978
Publisher
Elsevier
Publication Date
Volume
71
Issue
3
Identifiers
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1997.2722

Abstract

Abstract This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investigate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in which parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on group negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effects. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning. In addition, groups that excluded the low power negotiator from part of the discussion achieved less integrative agreements than groups that excluded the high power negotiator and groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. The results highlight the importance of negotiator participation for gaining a share of rewards and the critical role played by negotiators with low power for determining the quality of agreements reached.

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