Soit deux peintures identiques, l’une réalisée en 1888 par Waterhouse, l’autre par une intelligence artificielle. Si ces deux peintures sont indiscernables sur le plan perceptif, sont-elles distinctes sur le plan ontique ? Une telle différence est-elle susceptible d’affecter leur réception spectatorielle ? Dans cette expérience de pensée, sont envi...
In his well-known thought experiment regarding artificial intelligence (AI), John Searle sketched out the philosophic idea of “The Chinese room” – a room in which comprehensible rules (a program) allow a person to perfectly correlate one set of unknown linguistic symbols (a question) with another (an answer) of the same unfamiliar kind. In our crea...
This article deals with how Searle neglects sociology in his social ontology. I analyse this neglecting in terms of the problem of institutions, and their collective recognition. In the first section, I provide a contextualization of Searle’s base external realism, whose aim is to criticize Berger and Luckmann and their constructivist theory. In th...
L’article se propose de confronter les taxinomies de John Austin, John Searle et Denis Vernant aux analyses que consacre Anscombe à un type d’énonciation fondamental, par lequel un agent dit ce qu’il va faire : les expressions d’intention pour le futur, c’est-à-dire des énonciations telles que « Demain, j’irai me promener en montagne » ou bien « J’...
Published in Journal of Social Ontology
The suggestions outlined here include the following. Money is a bundle of institutionally sustained causal powers. Money is an institutional universal instantiated in generic currencies and particular money tokens. John Searle’s account of institutional facts is not helpful for understanding the nature of money as an institution (while it may help ...
This paper addresses strong artificial intelligence (AI) and, if it is possible,if consciousness could be replicated. Focus lies on Searle's article Minds,brains and programs and David J. Chalmers's theory that consciousness can be replicated because it is as an organizational invariant. The purpose is to evaluate Searle's argument against strong A...
This article addresses a neglected problem in Searle’s social ontology, namely, how human civilization may collapse. In the first section, I provide the theoretical framework. In the second section, I offer the key elements to understanding Searle’s ontology as well as his philosophy of society, emphasizing the role of constitutive rules and deonti...
Published in Journal of Social Ontology
Construing ontology as an inventory of what genuinely and nonredundantly exists, this paper investigates two questions: (i) Do all – or any – social phenomena belong in ontology? and (ii) What difference does it make what is, and is not, in ontology? First, I consider John Searle’s account of social ontology, and make two startling discoveries: Sea...
Published in Philosophia
Can one fully succeed in performing illocutionary acts addressed to others if they do not understand what one is purportedly saying? Can one, for example, tell others something if they do not understand what one supposedly said? It is not uncommon for speech act theorist to claim that one cannot. I, in contrast, will be arguing that it is possible ...
