Purpose: The objectives of this study are: (a) to examine the association between political budget and incumbents' regional head votes, (b) to examine the moderating effect of political competition in the association between political budget with incumbents' regional head votes. Theoretical framework: This article examines whether social assistan...
Published in Klio
This article reinterprets Dio’s view of the fall of the Republic by arguing that Dio viewed institutional political competition, rather than ambitious individuals, as the central destructive driving force in the Late Republic. Dio’s interpretation is hereby unique among ancient historiography. This interpretation has been skilfully interwoven in th...
The objective of this research has been primarily analytical, aiming at a better understanding of why Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are experiencing different outcomes in their nuclear decisions in the post-Fukushima era and how these deviating outcomes will influence these states’ non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years. To date, much of...
Why do people run for elective office? Indeed, it is a central topic in political science that arguably is controversial to reveal, but always appealing since public authority remains in office. This study provides an explorative analysis to investigate local elites’ motives running for local parliament and village offices respectively in Kebumen, ...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single-peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi-dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists...
Published in Automation and Remote Control
Social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment is analyzed for a society composed of two cohesive groups of similar size. Within the model of random walks determined by voting, explicit formulas are derived for the capital increments of the groups against the parameters of the environment and “claim thresholds” of the groups. The ...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare
This article studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt for voter conformism the generalized Wittman–Roemer model of political competition, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one a...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare
This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that citizens have about candidates’ preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we analyze the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information and that of politicians to make informative speeches, as well ...
Published in Social Choice and Welfare
Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics suggest that people are prone to systematic misperception of policy. This paper embodies voters’ misperceptions of policy into a standard political economy framework with complete information, and examines whether and to what extent political parties may use this misperception to manipulate...
Published in Crime, Law and Social Change
Both generalizations about “Asian corruption”, and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional sett...
