Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This note analyzes the effect that the specification of technology has on the long-run growth rate and the asymptotic speed of convergence in the one-sector endogenous-growth model. We compare three otherwise identical economies – with the same baseline and parameter values – but with different production technologies: CES, VES or Sobelow, respecti...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This paper extends the work of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. by taking into consideration a large class of different utility functions of economic agents. As in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Env...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
We examine the endogenous choice of commitment device to consumers’ expectations with network effects. Under Cournot competition, we show that choosing commitment to expectations for each firm is a dominant strategy regardless of the strength of network effects. However, under Bertrand competition, three types of commitment with both/no commitment/...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This paper examines the environmental effect of political connections at the individual and organizational levels. We integrate political connections at both levels in a four-stage game-theoretic framework to study the political interplay between an entrepreneur, a bureaucrat and a government. We distinguish individual-level political connections f...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This paper studies the effects of “psychological momentum” on strategic behavior in single- and double-elimination tournaments. We show that in presence of both positive and negative momentum a single-elimination tournament elicits a higher total effort than that of a double-elimination tournament if and only if the positive momentum is insignifica...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Tort models assume symmetry in the behavior of injurers and victims when faced by a threat of liability and a risk of harm without compensation, respectively. This assumption has never been empirically validated. Using a novel experimental design, we study the behavior of injurers and victims when facing symmetric accident risks. Experimental resul...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This paper considers contractual choice under imperfect legal systems, in particular, contracts with different timing of payment. Ex-ante payment contracts are risky for the buyer, because the seller may shirk. Ex-post payment contracts are risky for the seller, as the buyer may default. Optimal contract is solved for any given legal environment. E...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
A decision maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision maker and a...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 14...
Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
In the canonical random on-the-job search model with continuous firm heterogeneity, I show that a mean-preserving spread of the firm-productivity distribution raises the returns to mobility, i.e., the inter-firm mobility of workers as measured by the number of outside contacts per employment spell. Both sorting and rent-share mechanisms play a role...
