Published in Games and Economic Behavior
Risk compensation can undermine the ability of partially-effective vaccines to curb epidemics: Vaccinated agents may optimally choose to engage in more risky interactions and, as a result, may increase everyone's infection probability. We show that—in contrast to the prediction of standard models—things can be worse than that: Free and perfectly sa...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
•We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty.•Players optimize under slight uncertainty about each others' strategies.•When payoff functions are continuous it is a refinement of Nash equilibrium.•We give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile.•In Bertrand games with convex costs the criterion picks a u...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
•Characterize asymmetric parametric rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims.•The main axioms restrict how a division rule allocates intrapersonally.•These division rules are also shown to maximize a social welfare function.
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly d...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
•We parametrize axioms on allocation rules for exchange economies.•A parametrization of an axiom weakens the axiom monotonically.•We consider two parametrizations {δ-efficiency}δ∈[0,1] and {δ-strategy-proofness}δ∈[0,1].•For each δ∈(0,1], no rule is individually rational, δ-efficient, and strategy-proof.•For each δ∈(0,1], no rule is individually rat...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
•A published axiomatization result for the discrete Raiffa solution R is shown to be false.•Shortcomings and mistakes in the proof of that result are identified.•A modified version of that result and a proof have been provided.•The relation to the other published axiomatizations in the literature has been analyzed.
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether subjects adapt beliefs when gaining experience, and if ...
Published in Games and Economic Behavior
