Bastianello, Lorenzo Faro, José Heleno Santos, Ana
Published in
Economic Theory

A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to advise a decision maker about the choice between two policies f and g . Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of f is higher than the expected utility of g , the unanimity rule applies, and f is chosen. Otherwise, the precautionary principle is...

Makris, Miltiadis
Published in
Economic theory

Motivated by the Covid-19 epidemic, we build a SIR model with private decisions on social distancing and population heterogeneity in terms of infection-induced fatality rates, and calibrate it to UK data to understand the quantitative importance of these assumptions. Compared to our model, the calibrated benchmark version with constant mean contact...

Brandt, Felix Brill, Markus Seedig, Hans Georg Suksompong, Warut
Published in
Economic Theory

A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our understanding of stable choice functions. In particular, (1) we show that every stable choice function is generated by a ...

Ewerhart, Christian Quartieri, Federico
Published in
Economic theory

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equ...

Das, Kaustav Klein, Nicolas Schmid, Katharina
Published in
Economic theory

We examine a two-player game with two-armed exponential bandits à la (Keller et al. in Econometrica 73:39-68, 2005), where players operate different technologies for exploring the risky option. We characterise the set of Markov perfect equilibria and show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the player with the inferior technology uses ...

Drugeon, Jean-Pierre Ha-Huy, Thai Nguyen, Thi Do Hanh
Published in
Economic Theory

This article establishes a dynamic programming argument for a maximin optimization problem where the agent completes a minimization over a set of discount rates. Even though the consideration of a maximin criterion results in a program that is not convex and not stationary over time, it is proved that a careful reference to extended dynamic program...

Cingiz, Kutay Flesch, János Herings, P. Jean-Jacques Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Published in
Economic Theory

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \u...

Amir, Rabah
Published in
Economic Theory

This special issue brings together eight separate contributions reflecting recent advances in the methodology of supermodular optimization and games. Three of the papers fall in the main area of supermodular games. Balbus et al. (Econ Theory 67, 2019, 10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7) study supermodular games with a continuum of players. Jimenez-Martinez ...

Galichon, Alfred McCann, Robert
Published in
Economic Theory

Zhang, Kelvin Shuangjian
Published in
Economic Theory

We generalize the approach of Carlier (J Math Econ 35, 129–150, 2001) and provide an existence proof for the multidimensional screening problem with general nonlinear preferences. We first formulate the principal’s problem as a maximization problem with G-convexity constraints and then use G-convex analysis to prove existence.